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Prospects for a new  
EU-Russia Agreement 
 
 
 
 
 
Piotr Buras, Fraser Cameron, Cornelius Ochmann, Andrei Zagorski 
The latest EU-Russia-Summit on 27
th June 2008 marks a breakthrough in 
their relations. The planned negotiations on a new strategic partnership 
between the two actors were stalled for nearly two years. Now all member 
states have agreed on a broad negotiating mandate for the Commission. 
After the Irish ’No’ to the Lisbon Treaty the talks with Russia become a 
test case for the EU´s capacity to act as a global player.
THE VIEW FROM BRUSSELS 
by Fraser Cameron 
What are the options for the new Agree-
ment? The Commission view is that the 
more issues on the table the easier it will 
be to reach a comprehensive deal. In con-
trast, the Russian attitude would seem to 
favour a political framework agreement 
followed by sectoral agreements. Support-
ers of this approach argue that it would 
avoid any one issue derailing the whole 
package. Opponents argue that it would 
weaken the bargaining power of the EU 
overall and especially weaken the condi-
tionality many wish to see included re-
garding human rights and democracy. 
 
 
Who will lead the negotiations? On the 
Russian side, ambassador Chizhov has 
been named chief negotiator. On the EU 
side Eneko Landaburu will lead assisted 
by the Presidency/Council on CFSP issues. 
Member states will be briefed before and 
after each negotiating round. The talks 
will result in a ‘mixed agreement’ which 
would then require ratification by the par-
liaments of all 27 member states plus the 
European Parliament. It is not difficult to 
imagine at least one member state holding 
the agreement up for some political pur-
pose. 
 
Negotiating Issues: No one doubts that 
any new agreement will involve tough ne-
gotiations. The Commission insists that 
any new agreement should include the 
present institutional framework including 
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the last updates such as the PPC in order 
to ensure that the provisions of the 
Agreement are observed and implemented 
and to create opportunities for regular po-
litical dialogue on all issues of common 
concern. In order to avoid rigidity and pro-
long the endurance of the new agreement 
the PPC should have a fully fledged deci-
sion making power as to be able to adopt 
legal binding decisions through which the 
relationship could be developed and effec-
tively deepened. Another important issue 
to be addressed is that the institutional 
framework should be reorganised in view 
of bridging the gap between meetings at a 
high level and at experts’ level. 
 
The Agreement would also have to include 
the latest developments in the Northern 
Dimension as well as the Kaliningrad re-
gion, including the new transit provisions 
for Russians travelling outside the oblast. 
The European Neighbourhood Policy In-
strument (ENPI) should be also specified 
as the funding mechanism for the accom-
plishment of the Common Spaces. 
 
The economic elements to be included in 
the new agreement will directly depend on 
Russia’s accession to the WTO. The pro-
spective of WTO membership can influ-
ence the outcome of the new agreement in 
three possible ways. First, if Russia be-
came a WTO member before the negotia-
tion of the agreement there would be no 
need to include economic arrangements in 
the new legal framework, since the WTO 
would regulate trade relations of the par-
ties. Secondly, if Russia became a WTO 
member at the same time or right after the 
automatic prolongation of the PCA eco-
nomic provisions would exist in both legal 
instruments, but there would not necessar-
ily create legal inconsistency. Since PCA 
rules are based on GATT/WTO principles 
they usually do not pose compatibility 
problems. And thirdly, if Russia was not to 
enter the WTO by the time the next 
agreement is negotiated, which is more 
likely, the agreement would have to in-
clude economic clauses based on WTO 
rules in order to regulate trade relations 
between the partners until Russia would 
enter the trade organisation. 
 
Further, the new agreement should, build-
ing on and going further than the existing 
PCA and WTO provisions, concentrate on 
tackling trade barriers between the EU 
and Russia and emphasize regulatory is-
sues thus giving new momentum to eco-
nomic reforms in Russia. Like the PCA it 
should also include the objectives of creat-
ing a Free Trade Area (FTA). However, 
contrary to the former agreement the new 
one should go beyond the ‘evolutionary 
clause’ and envisage practical steps to 
achieve a FTA such as liberalization of 
trade in goods and services through the 
abolition of tariffs and harmonisation of 
specific standards.  
“Question of shared  
values is a major area of 
dispute.” 
Given EU dependence on Russian energy, 
this chapter will be a particularly con-
tested area of the negotiations. The EU has 
tried in several ways to deal with the en-
ergy dependency problem. First, it is try-
ing to persuade Russia to ratify the Energy 
Charter Treaty (ECT) which it has already 
signed and its Transit Protocol – a conse-
quence being the opening up of access to 
Gazprom’s pipelines. Secondly, it is push-
ing ahead with liberalisation and competi-
tion of the EU energy sector aiming at an 
EU common energy policy. In late 2007 
the Commission also introduced a proposal 
to prevent any third country (viz Russia) 
buying into the downstream area without 
reciprocity, a move that triggered protests 
from Gazprom. A major achievement of the 
current energy dialogue that resulted from 
the Russian-Ukrainian energy crisis of 
2006 is the creation of an ‘early warning 
mechanism’ in case any interruption of 
energy transport occurs. This mechanism 
is likely to be included in the new agree-
ment.  
 
Another area of dispute is the question of 
shared values. As a minimum the EU will  
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seek to ensure that Russia maintains its 
commitments under the UN, OSCE and 
Council of Europe, including the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR). These 
elements would demonstrate that Russia 
and the EU have a common international 
legal basis for the protection of human 
rights. Secondly, the so-called ‘condition-
ality clause’ should be an essential ele-
ment of the agreement, whereby if there is 
any material breach of the agreement each 
of the parties can suspend unilaterally the 
implementation of the agreement. Such 
links, already present in the current PCA, 
demonstrate the EU’s interest in promot-
ing and defending European democratic 
values in Russia.  
“Russia prefers a less  
ambitious document.” 
Justice and home affairs will be another 
difficult area. Judicial cooperation on ex-
tradition will be an important aspect of the 
new negotiations, a point raised by 
Lithuania and the UK. Both sides will also 
reaffirm their commitment to working to-
wards the eventual abolition of visas. 
Research, education and culture should be 
one of the least contentious areas for the 
negotiations. Russia has acknowledged the 
importance of participating in EU pro-
grammes in these areas and the talks will 
explore ways to further maximize oppor-
tunities for both sides. 
 
A comprehensive new agreement would, 
besides linking all the aspects of coopera-
tion, reinvigorate economic integration – 
envisaging practical steps to establish a 
FTA –, improve cooperation on energy, 
and add legal weight to the four common 
spaces. Any new agreement should also 
have as a very minimum the same stan-
dards referring to European values as the 
old PCA. The EU has significant but lim-
ited leverage on Russia. Its powerful in-
ternal market and its consumption of Rus-
sian energy resources do give it important 
bargaining chips. Russia also wants visa 
free access to the EU and participation in 
EU scientific and education programmes.  
WHAT MOSCOW THINKS 
by Andrei Zagorski 
There could be no better opportunity for 
the new Russian President Dmitrii Medve-
dev to score his first foreign policy suc-
cess and to boost relations with the Euro-
pean Union than the official launch of 
talks on an new Treaty with the EU. How-
ever, few people in Moscow believe that 
the new agreement could be much better 
than the current one. Many believe it can 
be only worse. 
 
The Russian policy-makers have initially 
sought to design a strategic partnership 
with the EU to honour the upgraded status 
of the country and to go hand in hand with 
the strategic partnership Russia has de-
veloped with its close friends in Europe, 
such as Germany, France or Italy. The in-
ner controversy within the EU over a 
common Russia-policy has taught them, 
however, that the opposite is likely to be 
true: the partnership with the EU would 
rather be no less difficult than relations 
with the most pronounced Russia-critics 
within the Union, such as the UK, Lithua-
nia, Estonia, or Poland. 
 
Moscow has repeatedly warned the EU not 
to allow particular interests and disputes 
of individual member states with Russia to 
overload the maturing partnership. By the 
time when the EU has reached final con-
sensus on what it wants from the negotia-
tions with the Russia, Moscow could only 
realize that the views of a new agreement 
in Brussels and Moscow have further di-
verged rather than converged over the 
past 18 months, so that disagreement is 
expected not only in details but in the 
definition of the nature and of the purpose 
of the treaty itself. 
 
Over the past 18 months, Moscow has also 
failed to strengthen its position by finaliz-
ing its accession to the WTO – an impor-
tant precondition for taking trade relations 
with the EU a step further. Though Russia 
has moved in the meantime a few steps  
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closer to that goal, the remaining unset-
tled issues keep the time for the accession 
uncertain. 
 
All in all, by now Moscow seems no longer 
to believe that the idea of an enhanced 
strategic partnership with the EU can be 
still viewed as a realistic outcome from the 
opening talks. It considers a less ambi-
tious document laying down the major 
principles of the Russia–EU partnership to 
be supported by sectoral agreements. But 
even this outcome appears uncertain. 
 
Plan A - short talks, short framework 
agreement:  The Russian government 
seeks a strategic partnership treaty with 
the EU to explicitly and boldly emphasize 
the equal status of the two partners leav-
ing no room for conditionality or the 
alignment of Russian regulatory frame-
work with the aquis communitaire. The 
treaty would include a preamble, four (or 
more) titles incorporating the main provi-
sions agreed upon with the view to devel-
oping the four common spaces and, most 
importantly, a title establishing the 
mechanism for common decision-making. 
 
While covering all relevant areas of coop-
eration, the new treaty would be a short 
framework document (about ten pages 
long) establishing major principles for co-
operation. More detailed regulation should 
be left out for supplementary sectoral 
agreements to be negotiated at a later 
stage. While showing openness as regards 
the inclusion into the treaty of specific 
provisions addressing more controversial 
issues, such as energy cooperation, Mos-
cow would still wish to limit the treaty to 
establishing the relevant principles.  
 
Major issues: The particular Russian de-
siderata as regards the new treaty are lim-
ited but include a number of relevant is-
sues which are likely to obtain high profile 
during the talks. Moscow looks forward to 
focus predominantly on the establishment 
of a mechanism for common decision-
making including on external security and 
crisis management. This mechanism 
should avoid the status of Russia as a 
partner of the EU which is allowed and 
welcome to join EU-led operations. Rather, 
common crisis management would require 
common decision-making and should be 
based on a clear legal agreement regulat-
ing relevant procedures and rules of en-
gagement. 
 
Moscow is keen to further pursue the goal 
of a visa free travel between Russia and 
the EU to be boldly spelled out in a new 
agreement. While seeking to protect its 
state owned energy companies and strate-
gically important sectors from any en-
croachment or takeover by foreign compe-
tition, Moscow seeks to remove any obsta-
cles for them to invest in the European 
markets and, particularly, into the down-
stream in the energy sector. It is open, 
however, to what extent Moscow wants to 
address those issues in the treaty itself 
except establishing the relevant basic 
principle. 
“Political support for free 
trade with the EU is low.” 
Moscow is obviously reluctant to embrace 
the idea of a further institutionalization of 
its cooperation with the EU on issues re-
lated to human rights and the rule of law 
and to make it more result oriented. It in-
sists, however, that the principle of recip-
rocity shall apply in this area as well 
granting the Russian Federation similar 
rights to investigate human rights issues 
within the EU. 
 
As far as longer term goals in economic 
cooperation are concerned, Moscow seems 
not to have made up its mind yet. In any 
case, the political support for the idea of 
establishing free trade with the EU seems 
to remain very low for the time being. 
 
Plan B - a protracted negotiation with 
indefinite outcome: While seeking to win 
the French presidency for the option of a 
fast negotiation of a concise framework 
agreement, Moscow realizes that this goal 
is difficult to obtain. It can’t ignore that  
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the outcome of the talks has to be ratified 
by all EU member states and that a short 
declaration of principles not responding to 
the concerns raised over the past months 
would be difficult to defend. Any bargain-
ing over the appropriate level of detail in 
the new treaty, sorting out those details 
and getting them ratified, on the other 
side, would inevitably be time consuming 
and would mean protracted talks with an 
open outcome. The process may well reach 
beyond the Russian political horizon 
which is limited to 2012 at latest when the 
Medvedev’s first term in the office expires. 
“Warsaw is still concerned 
about Russian energy  
policy.” 
The prospect for a difficult and protracted 
negotiation tends to consolidate the hesi-
tant policy of Moscow which would neither 
believe it can get a better agreement out of 
it, nor would have real political stakes in 
the outcome. This would imply a very con-
servative bargaining strategy by Moscow 
which, from the Summer 2007, has 
avoided any sign of being ready to com-
promise on its interest and to concede to 
demands of individual EU member states. 
It enters the talks with the EU sending a 
clear message that no one should presume 
Moscow needs the new treaty more than 
the EU does, so that no one should expect 
Moscow to be ready to make concessions 
without being appropriately rewarded for 
doing so. 
 
POLAND: STRONG INTERESTS, 
LESS STRIDENT TONE 
by Piotr Buras 
After giving up its opposition to the com-
mencement of negotiations with Russia, 
which had lasted for many months, the 
Tusk government has sent out two impor-
tant political signals. First, it wanted to 
underline Poland’s reliability and ability to 
cooperate in the EU, which during the time 
of the Kaczynski government was often 
called into question by its European part-
ners. Second, ending the deadlock was 
conceived as part of a change of direction 
in Polish policy on the countries to the   
east, which if possible now seeks to avoid 
or minimize a confrontation with Russia. 
Moscow will become increasingly impor-
tant for Polish diplomacy, which hitherto 
has been concentrated one-sidedly on Uk-
raine. 
 
However, in fundamental terms the Polish 
negotiating position has hardly changed. 
Polish interests are currently being de-
fined no differently than they have been 
for years. Right at the top of the list of pri-
orities in Warsaw is cooperation in the en-
ergy sector. Poland insists that agreement 
must first be reached on basic principles 
before there can be a fruitful dialogue with 
Russia on energy concerns. Warsaw be-
lieves that the EU should not deviate from 
the internal European consensus on en-
ergy policy as determined in the provi-
sions of the Energy Charter Treaty and the 
Transit Protocol. 
 
Poland views the Europe-wide expansion 
of Gazprom with some scepticism. It ser-
ves as proof of the fact that, on account of 
the EU’s weak foreign energy policy, the 
initiative in the area of energy cooperation 
has been handed over to Russia lock, stock 
and barrel. The Baltic pipeline is not the 
only example of this. Above all the fact 
that the Russian energy market has been 
largely closed for foreign investors is criti-
cized as being the expression of an unac-
ceptable inequality in the EU-Russia rela-
tionship. 
 
Poland is also rather cautious when it co-
mes to closer EU-Russia cooperation on 
security and defence issues. In the context 
of the post-Soviet area, to which Polish for-
eign policy pays a great deal of attention, 
Russia tends to be seen as the cause of 
conflicts and not as a partner helping to 
resolve them. Prospects for a partnership 
with Russia, Warsaw believes, can more 
easily be discerned with regard to global 
issues such as the proliferation of weapons  
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of mass destruction, terrorism, and climate 
change. A role for Russia within the fra-
mework of the ESDP or institutionalized 
cooperation with Moscow in order to re-
solve the “frozen conflicts” in the CIS area 
(e.g., subjects which might be discussed at 
the forthcoming PCA negotiations) do not 
receive the support of the Polish govern-
ment. 
 
This position must be seen against the 
broader background of Polish policy to-
wards its eastern neighbour. As Prime Mi-
nister Donald Tusk wrote in the Frank-
furter Allgemeine Zeitung on 18 February 
2008, “the general partnership between 
the EU and Russia must not constitute an 
obstacle for the development of our rela-
tions with other neighbours in eastern Eu-
rope.” Thus he rejects far-reaching Rus-
sian involvement in EU policy in the re-
gion, since this is deemed to be potentially 
dangerous. Poland welcomes the current 
approach in which relations with Russia 
and the other eastern neighbours of the EU 
are being maintained and deepened simul-
taneously. However, the recent Polish-
Swedish proposals for an “Eastern Part-
nership” also envisage the inclusion of 
Russia. The idea is to provide an impetus 
for regional cooperation between the EU’s 
eastern neighbours and to promote deeper 
sector-based cooperation between specific 
countries and the EU. 
“German economy sup-
ports bilateral approach.” 
In the forthcoming negotiations with Rus-
sia Warsaw wishes to increase the number 
of social contacts. The 2007 agreement on 
simplified visa regulations is seen in a po-
sitive light. The new EU-Russia agreement 
could enshrine the long-term goal of abol-
ishing visa requirements altogether. It is 
also to be expected that Poland will place 
great importance on the significance of 
human rights and democratic values as 
pillars of the new treaty. The condition-
ality clause, on the basis of which the im-
plementation of the treaty can be sus-
pended if one of the treaty partners re-
fuses to comply with its provisions, will 
also receive staunch support from the Pol-
ish government. 
 
All in all Warsaw will favour a relatively 
detailed and legally binding regulation of 
the sensitive issues (energy policy, human 
rights). A more general framework agree-
ment would probably be insufficient from 
a Polish point of view, since it would ex-
clude what the Poles consider to be the 
most important points. The question of the 
institutionalization of security cooperation 
could turn out to be particularly problem-
atical for Poland, especially since it is high 
on the Russian agenda. 
 
 
AN OPTIMISTIC VIEW FROM 
BERLIN 
by Cornelius Ochmann 
In several speeches Frank-Walter Stein-
meier has attempted to define the German 
position concerning the future of Euro-
pean-Russian relations. It is based on the 
notion that the EU, acting on the basis of a 
“European Ostpolitk,” should adopt a com-
mon approach towards Russia. 
 
In the course of his visit to Russia in June 
2008, Steinmeier proclaimed the start of a 
modernization partnership. In essence this 
is all about cooperation in areas which are 
of crucial importance for the future: cli-
mate and energy policy, the common striv-
ing for energy efficiency, healthcare pol-
icy, dealing with the consequences of an 
ageing society, the areas of education and 
science, and questions relating to the rule 
of law.  
 
This bilateral approach is supported in 
particular by the German economic elite. 
In recent years the export-based German 
economy has witnessed an enormous up-
surge in trade with Russia.  
 
On the one hand Germany, like the rest of 
the EU, is dependent on energy supplies 
from Russia. On the other hand, Russia it-
self needs investment inflows and above  
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all know-how in order to modernize its e-
conomy and reduce its dependence on en-
ergy. Investors are very often critical of 
the opaque legal framework. Hitherto Eu-
ropean energy dependence on Russia has 
not been perceived to be a threat – Ger-
many certainly has a positive attitude to 
greater cooperation in the energy sector. 
 
The German position finds expression in 
the Petersburg dialogue, which unites 
Germany’s political, economic and social 
interests in its dealings with Russia under 
one roof. Noteworthy is the 
internationalized character of these rela-
tions, which is reflected in the motto of the 
next meeting: “Russia and Germany in the 
globalized world – Partners in Moderniza-
tion.” 
 
On the agenda are important European to-
pics such as demographics, migration, the 
provision of healthcare, and the rule of 
law. 
 
It remains to be seen whether the German 
side will be able to have an influence on 
the EU position. Freedom of travel in par-
ticular is right at the top of the agenda as 
far as the Russians are concerned. The 
EU’s restrictive visa policy applies above 
all to young people, who, ever since the 
expansion of the Schengen area in Decem-
ber 2007, have been unable to travel in 
the EU as a result of numerous bureau-
cratic obstacles. 
 
German-Russian Exchange (Deutsch-
Russischer Austausch), like other German 
and Russian human rights organizations, 
has called for the inclusion of human and 
civil rights and the rule of law in a sepa-
rate section of the forthcoming PCA. They 
are of the opinion that it is not enough to 
merely mention them in the preamble, as 
in the currently valid agreement con-
cluded in 1997. 
 
 
 
 
The shape of things  
to come 
Whereas it is true that the EU Commission 
has a mandate to conduct the negotiations, 
the interests of the member states are very 
diverse, as a comparison of the Polish and 
German positions demonstrates. It is high-
ly unlikely that the negotiations will pro-
duce results in the immediate future. The 
heads of the EU negotiators will have to 
bear in mind that any compromise will be 
viewed in terms of the domestic policies 
being pursued by the various govern-
ments. The Russian side does not have to 
worry about such internal tensions. Yet it 
would be wrong to underestimate the 
strength of anti-western sentiments. Whe-
reas it is true that these are primarily di-
rected against the foreign policy of the U-
nited States, such emotions could easily 
turn against the EU at a moment’s notice. 
The Irish rejection of the Treaty of Lisbon 
has also tended to reinforce the negative 
attitude towards the EU among the Rus-
sian elite. It was never convinced that the 
EU would be able to take action in the 
sphere of foreign policy, and now its pre-
judices seem to have been confirmed. 
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